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What Motivates Banks to use Derivatives: 
Evidence from Taiwan 
 
Abstract 
Banks are active users of derivatives. Using banks listed on the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange for which there is detailed derivatives information for the period 1998 to 
2005, we examine the determinants of derivatives usage and its impact on bank risk. 
Using specific bank characteristic variables that proxy for the motivations and effects 
of banks participating in the derivatives market and end-quarter transaction volumes, 
we investigate the rationale for derivatives usage that are discussed in the literature. 
Using Probit and panel data methods and testing for endogeneity, we investigate 
whether risk management, informational and economies of scale arguments as well as 
agency and managerial explanations are good predictors of observed activity.  
Our results support the evidence of prior studies that risk management, and 
informational and scale factors explain the use of derivatives. On the other hand, our 
findings do not show that the use of derivatives affects observable risks. We also 
observe a substitution effect which suggests a rational approach to the participation 
decision. However, we find no support for agency and managerial motives, which we 
partly attribute to the specific regulatory, legal, and cultural environment that exists in 
Taiwan. 
 
JEL classification: C3; G32; M41 
Keywords: Derivatives; Hedging; Risk management, Banks
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What Motivates Banks to use Derivatives: 
Evidence from Taiwan 
 
1. Introduction 
Financial economists have long been interested in the reasons why firms engage in 
risk management. While the rationale for the corporate use of derivatives has been the 
subject of a number of studies, there is comparatively little research into the 
motivations for banks and other financial institutions to use derivatives. As 
intermediaries with highly-levered balance sheets, banks have large exposures to 
interest rate, commodity, and currency risks and need effective ways to manage these 
exposures. Derivatives provide an efficient tool for off-balance sheet risk management 
since they provide an easy means to hedge (manage) the residual risk from 
commercial operations. Using a unique Taiwanese dataset this paper examines the 
motivation for derivative use by banks. 
The evidence for corporate use of derivatives suggests that non-financial firms 
primarily use the instruments to manage financial risks (Brown, 2001; Geczy, Minton 
and Schrand, 1997; Hentschel and Kothari, 2001; Mian, 1996; Nanse, Smith and 
Smithson, 1993). Financial theory also suggests that corporate risk management will 
have a positive effect on firm value in the presence of capital market imperfections 
such as financial distress and bankruptcy costs (Smith and Stulz, 1985), convex tax 
rates, or underinvestment problems (Bessembinder, 1991; Froot, Scharfstein, and 
Stein, 1985; Smith and Watts, 1992). In addition, pervasive agency conflicts between 
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managers and shareholders and other managerial factors, such as earnings 
management and speculation, also explain observed behavior (Brown 2001; Core, 
Guay, and Kothari, 2002; Kalay, 1992; Smith and Wakeman, 1985; Tufano, 1996). 
While the understanding of the corporate use of derivatives is relatively well-
advanced, there is a dearth of research into the motivation for banks and other 
financial institutions to use derivatives. Colquitt and Hoyt (1997) examine corporate 
hedging behavior in the life assurance industry and find support for a number of the 
motives put forward for the corporate uses of derivatives. Also investigating insurance 
companies, Cummins, Phillips, and Smith (2001) find similar motives and 
explanations for derivatives usage that confirm and expand on the results of their 
earlier study (Cummins, Phillips, and Smith 1997). De Ceuster et al (2003) provide 
international evidence by using data for both life and general insurance companies in 
Australia. A number of other studies of derivatives use on different types of financial 
firms indicate the motivation is not dissimilar to that for corporate users (Koski and 
Pontif 1999; Schrand and Unal, 1998). Brewer, Jackson and Moser (1996) look at the 
incentives provided by the regulatory environment that might encourage risk-taking 
using derivatives but find that their sample of savings and loan companies do not 
show evidence of increased risk 
Firm characteristics influence the extent of hedging activity. Flannery and James 
(1984) and Colquitt and Hoyt (1997) find that bank common stocks are sensitive to 
interest rate effects. In addition, banks with a larger element of international activities 
are more likely to face and accordingly manage their currency exposure (Allayannis 
and Ofek, 2001). Smith and Stulz (1985) predict that increases in option holdings 
should be associated with less hedging. Corporate governance may also influence risk 
management decisions. It is argued that outside directors who are appointed to act in 
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the shareholders’ interests have an incentive to signal that they indeed do act in that 
way (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Mayers et al., 1997). Firms dominated by independent 
outside directors generally are considered to have better corporate governance and 
risk management attributes. Whidbee and Wohar (1999) find that banks’ decision to 
use derivatives is related to the proportion of outside directors as a percentage of all 
directors. Less informed outsider board members may have concerns about 
derivatives use due to their impact on the bank’s leverage and risk-taking.  
Derivatives reduce the likelihood of financial distress by decreasing the variability 
in firm value, thus reducing the expected costs of financial distress (Smith and Stulz, 
1985; Mayers and Smith, 1987). Sinkey and Carter (2000) provide similar evidence 
on the characteristics of banks that undertake risk management using derivatives 
which indicates that smaller banks are more likely to hedge. On the other hand, some 
studies argue that large firms have more resources to set up a hedging program and 
employ personnel with expertise in derivatives than do small firms and hence are 
more likely to use derivatives (Hoyt, 1989; Colquitt and Hoyt, 1997; Cummins et al. 
1997; Cummins et al., 2001). In line with the scale and informational economies 
argument, Sinkey and Carter (2000) contend that affiliated banks have access to the 
resources necessary to be active derivative users. They find that affiliated banks are 
more likely to use derivatives due to the existence of barriers to entry in banks’ 
derivatives activities. They also argue that banks that generate higher profitability 
from intermediation are more likely to undertake derivatives hedging programs to 
lock in profits, while those with lower profitability are more likely to assume risks or 
speculate using derivatives. 
It has been suggested that alternative and less costly risk management activities 
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may act as substitutes for the use of derivatives. First, maintaining higher liquidity 
could alleviate insolvency risk through lower dividend payouts or through having a 
higher current ratio and accordingly reduce the propensity of banks to hedge (Amihud 
and Murgia, 1997). Nance et al. (1993) indicate that firms could decrease the agency 
and expected financial distress costs associated with straight debt financing by issuing 
preferred stock.  
Banks as intermediary institutions may use derivatives as a risk management 
tool to hedge on-balance sheet transactions. They may speculate on movements in 
interest rates, exchange rates, and commodity prices, although few would to 
openly admit this. The empirical evidence on the relation between derivatives use 
and corporate risk is mixed (Tufano 1996). Guay (1999) demonstrates that 
derivative use reduces corporate risk. Choi and Elyasiani (1997) show that there is 
a link between the volume of a bank’s interest rate and foreign exchange rate 
derivatives contracts and the bank’s interest rate and currency risks. Of interest to 
this study, they find that currency derivatives contracts are negatively related to 
bank risk. Sinkey and Carter (2000) find that banks with a higher likelihood of 
financial distress use derivatives to hedge risk. However, when looking at mutual 
funds, Koski and Pontiff (1999) show that risk exposure and return performance 
are unaffected by the use of derivatives. Also, Hentschel and Kothari (2001) argue 
that derivative use could increase or reduce corporate risk, but find no consistent 
evidence to support their argument.  
 
Adkins, Cater, and Simpson (2007) investigate derivatives use and managerial 
incentives and find that managers who have a significant portion of their wealth 
invested in the firm have an incentive to hedge corporate risks. In addition, they point 
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out that the managerial labor market could form its perception of managers’ capability 
based on firm performance, a factor which could also induce managers to undertake 
hedging (Cannella, Fraser and Lee, 1995). Sullivan and Strong (2007) find that 
earnings variation falls when managers have greater wealth concentration in their 
banks and when incentives to monitor increase, but also find that stock ownership by 
hired-managers can increase total risk. However, earlier papers by Saunders, Stock 
and Travlos (1990) and Whidbee and Wohar (1999) argue that as managers acquire 
more equity in a bank, the bank assumes more risk and uses less hedging. Hence there 
is little agreement concerning managerial motivation and banks’ use of derivatives.  
We believe that our study is the first to cover both the incentives for hedging with 
derivatives and its effects on entity risk for banks. Previous derivatives studies focus 
on either the determinants of corporate usage of derivatives (Nance et al., 1993; 
Goldberg et al., 1998; Heaney and Winata, 2005) or the derivatives impact on firm 
risk (Choi and Elyasiani, 1997; Guay, 1999; Hentschel, and Kothari, 2001). 
Combining the two issues in our study, we present a more complete picture of the 
operating and financial characteristics of banks that are motivated to use derivatives. 
This study extends the literature on derivatives usage in three ways. First we 
investigate what factors prompt banks to use derivatives. As our dataset differentiates 
between trading and non-trading uses and the underlying assets and liabilities, 
including currency, interest rate, equity, commodity, and credit-related contracts, we 
are able to make new inferences about the nature of derivatives activity in our sample. 
We use this classification to investigate how fundamental characteristics and 
managerial variables explain the utilization of specific types of instruments. In 
particular, we assess bank characteristics and participation/volume decisions using 
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currency and interest rate contracts. We choose these particular contracts due to their 
relatively high trading volumes. 
Second, we are able to control for the problem that derivative use may be 
endogenous. For instance, certain characteristics of a bank may simultaneously 
determine both the level of the utilization of derivatives and bank risk. Our models 
specifically address this problem and hence provide more robust tests.  
Third, as we use quarterly reporting data, we are able to analyze both within-years 
as well as end-of-year reporting transactions. We are able to extend studies such as 
Cummins, et al., (1997), Hardwick and Adams, (1999), Cummins, et al., (2001), and 
Shu and Chen, (2003) which rely on annual data. Simply using year-end positions 
excludes derivatives positions taken and then closed out for window-dressing or tax 
considerations. We believe our data mitigates this problem in that we can distinguish 
between trading and non-trading derivatives activity. In addition, holding derivatives 
instruments for hedging purposes for less than one quarter is relatively rare in 
practice. So while we do not have access to daily derivatives positions and we cannot 
observe intra-quarter activity, our data helps mitigate the measurement bias seen in 
other studies. 
Understanding how banks use derivatives is important. Whereas the use of 
exchange-traded commodity derivatives has a long history, financial derivatives have 
a relatively recent history only being introduced in the 1970s. In the case of Taiwan, 
interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives were only launched in 1998 on the 
Taiwan Futures Exchange and hence our study covers the period when Taiwanese 
banks started to have access to locally-traded derivatives.  
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First, we examine risk management motives using a range of bank-specific factors 
found in the literature to influence participation activity in derivatives, namely 
characteristics such as size, affiliation, foreign operations, and so forth. We then 
examine whether bank characteristics and agency and corporate governance variables 
explain why banks avoid observable risk. We also study whether alternatives to 
derivative instruments and technical expertise in derivatives affect the usage decision. 
Third, we examine the extent to which banks hedge against firm risks. In our analysis, 
we take account of the endogeneity problem that banks’ characteristics may influence 
derivative usage and risk. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 
introduces the sample and data, and we explain our methodology. In Section 3, we 
present the empirical results from which we offer some conclusions and their 
implications in Section 4.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
This study uses data on all Taiwanese domestic banks that are listed on the Taiwan 
Stock Exchange (TSE) and Gre Tai Securities Market (GTSM), the over-the-counter 
securities exchange, over the period 1998:Q2 to 2005:Q1, a total of 28 quarters. The 
information on derivative usage is acquired from various editions of the publication 
Condition and Performance of Domestic Banks filed with the Central Bank of China 
containing end-of-quarter records of notional values of derivatives categorized as 
either trading or non-trading. The quarterly data on firm-specific characteristics are 
collected from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) Data Bank and the financial 
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statements provided by the Securities and Futures Institute (SFI).1 We have had to 
omit branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks, unlisted domestic banks, and 
regional depository institutions due to lack of data. The final sample consists of a 
panel of 934 firm-quarter observations that relates to 34 banks in 1998:Q2 and 
increases to 35 in 2005:Q1. The variables used in our study are defined in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
We use a probit model to examine the effects of firm-specific factors that 
influence participation in derivatives.2 This approach allows for the discreteness of 
participation decisions and employs a dummy variable which equals one for users and 
zero for nonusers.3 The probit model is structured as follows: 
( )1 , ,i,t i tZ F P−=                                                 (1) 
and 
( ) ( ) 2, 2, , , 1 ,2
i t s
Z
i t i t i tP F Z Z e dsβ π
−
−∞
′= =F = ∫                           (2) 
where Zi,t is the vector of explanatory variables, 1F − is the inverse of the cumulative 
normal probability function, Pi,t is the probability that bank i in quarter t participates 
in derivatives activities, s is a standard normal variable and β is the vector of the 
parameters to be estimated. 
                                                 
1 The quarterly data on non-performing loans during 1998-1999 are only available for a small portion 
of banks in the TEJ Data Bank. As a result, we use the year-end values of non-performing loans, which 
were hand-collected from the annual financial reports offered by the Taiwan Securities and Futures 
Information Center, as substitutes for the incomplete quarterly information for this variable.  
2 For robustness checks, we also conduct the empirical analysis using logit and OLS models, which we 
do not discuss in this paper. Although the parameter estimates vary somewhat from the results we 
report here, the main tenor of the statistical test results remains unchanged.  
3 We use FXPAR for currency-related derivatives participation and IRPAR for interest-rate related 
participation. 
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Combining equations (1) and (2) a simple probit regression model, for each of our 
three dependent variables to be defined subsequently, takes the form: 
( ) 





++++== ∑
=
K
k
tititikktiti xFZFP
1
,,,,, εtνβα  (3) 
where tiZ ,  represents the derivatives participation of bank i at the end of quarter t and 
is a binary variable proxy that takes the value one for derivatives users and zero 
otherwise. kitx  is the value of the k
th explanatory variable for bank i in quarter t; k is 
the index of explanatory variables and k = 1, …., K; i is the index of bank and i = 
1, …., N; t is the index of quarter and t = 1, …., T; α  is a constant term; iυ and tt  
accounts for individual bank and time effects, and ,i tε is a classic error term.  
In our model for the motivations for derivative usage, we use the same regressors 
as in equation (3) and estimate the following panel regression model: 
titi
K
k
tikkti xD ,
1
,,, εtνβα ++++= ∑
=
 (4) 
where Di,t is the derivative use by bank i at the end of quarter t, measured as the 
quarter-end notional value of derivatives positions (hereafter QEP) normalized by 
market value of total assets.4 Two different measures of QEP are used: currency-
related holdings (FXQEP), and interest rate-related holdings (IRQEP). 
For our risk model, we assess the effects of participation and volume decisions on 
capital market risk, which we measure either as total risk (SDR), normalized total risk 
                                                 
4 Market value is defined as the sum of market value of common equity, which is computed from the 
product of the closing stock price at the last trading day of each quarter multiplied by the number of 
shares outstanding, plus book value of liabilities and preferred stock. We use as our numerator 
derivatives positions classified as non-trading (that is, held for hedging purposes). 
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(SDRN), systematic risk (BETA), or unsystematic risk (IDS). To this end, we regress 
our risk measure on the use of derivatives and several control variables. Drawing on 
the previous research on firm risk and the use of derivatives and controlling for other 
risk-related characteristics, we specify a participation dummy as a variable measuring 
bank participation in derivatives. The panel data method is applied to estimate the 
following model: 
tititititi CVZR ,,2,1, εtυββα +++++=                              (5) 
where Ri,t is firm risk, tiZ ,  is a measurement of participation in derivatives 
contracting, and tiCV ,  refers to the set of control variables. Following the approach 
used by Hentschel and Kothari (2001), we also control for financial leverage 
(LEVER), market value of equity (EMV) and book to market ratio (BM). 
Controlling for bank characteristics, we examine the effect of transaction volumes in 
the same way as our risk model but replace the participation dummy in equation (5) 
with our transaction volume measure to assess the effects of the level of derivatives 
usage on bank risk, again using a panel model:  
tititititi CVDR ,,2,1, εtυββα +++++=        
       (6) 
where Di,t is the level of derivative use proxied by FXQEP or IRQEP, depending on 
the model.  
In order to examine the marginal effect of the transaction volume decision, we use the 
Hentschel and Kothari (2001) methodology and construct 11 volume-based portfolios 
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in terms of the level of derivatives use for each quarter. Portfolio 0 encompasses 
banks that do not use any derivatives. The remaining banks are divided into 10 
portfolios with approximately equal number of banks in each. Portfolio 1 consists of 
the banks with the lowest level of derivative use, while portfolio 10 includes those 
with the highest level. The level of derivative use is proxied by QEP in equation (7).  
Controlling for risk factors, we examine whether banks with different levels of 
derivatives use differ in their risk by using portfolio dummies. Particular attention is 
paid to the difference in risk between extreme users, i.e., banks with the highest and 
lowest derivatives usage.  
tititim
QEP
mimti CVPR ,,2
10
1 ,,
εtυβαα +++++= ∑ =       
       (7) 
where the portfolio dummy QEP,i mP is assigned a value of one for bank i at the end of 
quarter t if the bank is in portfolio m and zero otherwise. 
We start our analysis with both fixed-effects models (FEM) and random-effects 
models (REM) since we have no a priori case that what we observe conforms to a 
particular model. However, if the general tenor of the results remains unchanged, our 
results will be robust to either specification. In order to determine the most 
appropriate model, we employ the two-stage diagnostic procedure suggested by 
Greene (2003, pp. 298-303). First, the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test of Breusch and 
Pagan (1980) is used to compare OLS estimation against FEM/REM; a large value for 
the LM test statistic favors FEM/REM. Second, the specification test by Hausman 
(1978) is used to test REM against FEM; a large value for the Hausman test statistic 
favors FEM. For brevity, we report results for the most appropriate model determined 
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by using these two tests. In addition, we examine if heteroscedasticity exists in the 
error term using the White (1980) test. If it does, a heteroscedasticity-consistent 
estimation by Greene (2003, pp. 316-317) is performed.  
In our tests of the effects of the participation/level of derivatives usage on risk, we 
assume that derivatives participation/level is exogenous. However, as discussed, this 
may not be the case. Certain bank characteristics may jointly influence both 
derivatives usage and risk and thus may be potential sources of endogeneity. If so, our 
coefficient estimates from regressions will be biased. We use significant variables 
obtained from the determinants model as instruments, those correlated with the 
endogenous variable, but uncorrelated with the disturbances. We perform a Hausman 
(1978) test for the endogeneity of derivatives participation/level and a Granger (1969) 
causality test to explore the endogenous patterns within specifications of the risk 
model and reduce the likely effects of endogeneity by using a 2SLS regression. 
We also address the potential problem of multicollinearity. This applies especially 
in the risk model where there might be correlation between the risk-management 
incentives and the hedging level. Since a linear relation might exist among more than 
two variables, we examine the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for each explanatory 
variable employed. As a rule-of-thumb, variables can be regarded as highly collinear 
if a VIF exceeds ten (Gujarati, 2004, p. 362). The VIFs range from 1.00 to 5.52, 
indicating that the degree of multicollinearity is not severe in this study. 
 
3. Results 
We present the results of our different models first by presenting the determinants 
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that influence participation in derivatives activity before discussing the results for 
bank risks. Table 2 shows the probit analysis for the effects of firm-specific 
characteristic on banks’ participation activities for currency-related and interest rate-
related derivative instruments. The likelihood ratio test and the Lagrange multiplier 
test results indicate that the models provide a good statistical fit. In both currency- and 
interest rate-related models the coefficients on the foreign exchange exposure variable 
(FX), measured by the proportions of net income of offshore banking units, are 
positive and highly significant. This suggests that banks with higher foreign currency 
exposure are more likely to engage in derivatives activities. This is consistent with 
prior studies such as Goldberg et al., (1998) and Allayannis and Ofek, (2001), in that 
banks with a higher proportion of net income from overseas subsidiaries are likely to 
have a greater propensity to hedge foreign exchange risk with currency-related 
instruments. Our results also supports the claim made by Goldberg et al. (1998) that 
banks using interest rate derivatives are more multinational. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
We find that asset-liability mismatches as indicated by our gap measures (IGLIA) 
and (IGAST) provide partial validation that observable risks contribute to derivatives 
usage. The coefficient of one of the interest rate risk related variables (IGLIA) is 
weakly positively associated with the interest rate derivatives decision and is 
significant at the ten percent level. This finding lends support to the view that 
derivatives are being used to manage the risks faced by banks. On the other hand, the 
sign for IGAST is negative but statistically insignificant. These conflicting results 
suggest that banks are more likely to use interest rate derivatives when interest rate 
sensitive liabilities outweigh assets. This might be attributable to the different 
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implications for our measures of gap risk. Looking at how other risk measures affect 
the decision, the z statistics show that the measure CREDIT (the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans) is not associated with a higher likelihood of 
derivatives usage. In this, our results differ from those of Sinkey and Carter (2000) 
and the fact that IGLIA is weakly significant but CREDIT is not does not support 
Schrand and Unal’s (1998) hypothesis of coordinated risk management. However, as 
discussed later, there may be local factors that affect derivatives activity and would 
explain the lack of significance in our results. 
The significantly positive coefficients on the firm size variable (SIZE) support the 
proposition that derivatives usage is partly dependent on scale and informational 
economies. This finding is consistent with the results of Nance et al. (1993), Mian 
(1996), Colquitt and Hoyt (1997), Sinkey and Carter (2000) and Cummins et al. 
(2001). However this finding runs counter to the idea that banks hedge against costly 
financial distress (Smith and Shultz, 1985). 
We find a significant positive relation between the issuance of preferred stock (PS) 
and the decision to participate in derivatives activities in both models. The evidence is 
contradictory to our expectation, as proposed by Nance et al., (1993), that banks 
control agency and expected financial distress costs arising from long-term financing 
through the issuance of preferred stock. But it is consistent with Froot et al. (1993) 
who argue that issuing preferred stock increases leverage and thus the 
underinvestment problem, which can be alleviated by hedging. 
We find that our measures for internal diversification (HERFR for revenues and 
HERFLTL for long-term liabilities) have a significant effect on the participation 
decision. HERFR is significant for the use of currency and interest rate derivatives 
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and HERFLTL influences the decision on interest rate derivatives. Our results are 
consistent with the view that diversification provides an alternative or reduces the 
demand for derivatives instruments for hedging purposes. This finding lends some 
support to the view that banks are likely to seek to manage their risks by diversifying 
revenues rather than simply relying on financial hedging. Our other measures for 
diversification such as the ratio of non-operating to operating income (NOI) and 
diversification of costs (HERFC) are not found to be statistically significant. One 
possible explanation for this is that banks focus on balance sheet rather than income 
risk measures. Also it may be the case that these diversification variables are poor 
proxies for these factors.  
We find that for interest related derivatives the participation decision is positively 
affected by the net interest margin (NIM). The significance of NIM could be 
indicative of the fact that, with higher earnings generated from lending activities, 
banks have a greater need for interest rate derivatives to hedge NIM generated 
income. That is, banks with above average net interest margin would desire to lock in 
their interest spreads through the use of interest rate contracts. 
The estimated coefficient for liquidity (CR) is negative and significant at the ten 
percent level in the participation model for interest rate derivatives, while it is positive 
but insignificant in the model for currency derivatives. This finding lends only weak 
support to the financial distress cost argument that banks can reduce the likelihood of 
encountering financial distress and thereby reduce its expected costs. We also find that 
the dividend payoff (DIV) exerts a negative impact on currency derivatives 
participation. This finding is contrary to the results of prior studies (e.g., Kalay, 1982; 
Nance et al., 1993) who suggest that firms could reduce the expected agency costs and 
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financial distress costs by paying lower dividends to control the underinvestment 
problem. One possible explanation for the contradiction is that lower dividend 
payouts provide higher free cash flows, increasing the underinvestment problem. 
Some of the firm-specific elements found to be important incentives for the 
hedging decision in the extant literature are insignificant in our probit analysis. For 
instance, unlike Smith and Stulz (1985) and Tufano (1996), there is no observable 
relationship between managerial ownership (MO) and the decision to use derivatives. 
Our results do not support the notion that, as their shareholdings increase, managers 
engage more in hedging using derivatives. Nor does this result provide support for the 
argument put forward by Whidbee and Wohar (1999) that in the banking industry 
managerial ownership is inversely related to hedging using derivatives. The 
coefficient on our corporate governance variable (GOV) is consistently negative, but 
insignificant at the 0.1 level. While we do not find any support that corporate 
governance is related to the use of derivatives, we recognize that a single variable may 
be inadequate given the conflicting views on the impact of corporate governance on 
derivatives activity. Nor do we observe in our model the expected significant positive 
association between growth options (GROWTH) and the decision to use derivatives. 
The estimated coefficient on GROWTH is consistently positive as expected, but 
insignificant at the 0.1 level. Overall, there seems little support for the idea that 
agency and managerial motives influence derivatives activity. 
The affiliation variable (AFFIL) in our models are insignificant and have mixed 
signs. One possible explanation is that whether the affiliated bank uses derivatives 
largely depends on the parent company. If the parent bank is an active derivatives 
user, the affiliated bank is better able to use derivatives than a bank without affiliation. 
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However, this may not mean that the affiliated bank is more likely to use derivatives 
because its parent bank may be in charge of the risk management program.  
As with the participation decision, our volume decision analysis uses two sets of 
equations estimated using panel data models for currency-related and interest rate-
related derivatives holdings by quarter-end. These are shown in Panels A and B of 
Table 3. The White (1980) test results are significant at the 0.01 level, suggesting the 
present of heteroscedasticity in the error term and as a result, the heteroscedasticity–
consistent estimation suggested by Greene (2003) is performed to derive White-
adjusted t-statistics. The results from the LM and Hausman tests suggest that the most 
appropriate specifications for currency and interest rate derivatives are random-effects 
models. We test for endogeneity using the derivatives measures and risk metrics and 
carry out the Hausman test for each volume decision-related specification in the risk 
model using significant variables in the determinants model as instruments. The 
unreported results show that the currency-related positions are endogenously 
determined with unsystematic risk. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
To assess whether we have statistical support for the direction of causation 
between derivatives holdings and bank exposures as well as to examine the robustness 
of the findings of the Hausman test, we perform the Granger causality test using the 
quarterly mean values of each derivatives measure and risk metric that are lagged by 
eight quarters5. The unreported results indicate that firm risks generally do not 
Granger-cause the derivatives decision, and vice versa with the exception of the 
                                                 
5 The choice of eight lags is arbitrary, mainly due to the limitation of the software used. Different 
numbers of lags also are tried. The tenor of the results remains unchanged. 
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relationship between total risk/unsystematic risk and interest rate-related positions. 
The F-test rejects the null hypothesis that firm risks (total risk/unsystematic risk) do 
not Granger-cause the interest rate-related position. Nevertheless, both test statistics 
for the reverse causality fail to achieve significance. These findings do not 
consistently corroborate our earlier results from the Hausman test in support of the 
endogeneity of currency derivatives decisions. The causal direction between currency 
derivatives usage and unsystematic risk is not evident. However, recognizing the 
endogenous nature of the relation, we apply the 2SLS regression to estimate the 
regression instead of the panel data approach. 
As may be expected, there are fewer significant results in the volume decision 
models than in the participation models. One explanation for the differences is that the 
derivatives market may be dominated by a few large banks even though there are a 
large number of market participants. We find a strong positive relationship between 
holding company affiliation (AFFIL) and the volume decision, suggesting that 
affiliated banks use more derivatives than unaffiliated ones. This is consistent with the 
marginal costs hypothesis suggested by Cummins et al. (2001).  
Our results accord with the prediction that derivatives use is inversely related to 
the availability of substitutes. The relationship between the extent of derivatives use 
and the alternative instruments, namely diversification of business operations (NOI), 
the diversification of revenues (HERFR)6, and diversification of long-term 
investments (HERFLTI), is negative and significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 level in the 
interest rate derivatives models. However, we do not find the same relationship for 
currency derivatives models. We attribute the differences between the two results to 
                                                 
6 Consistent with what we have evidenced in the probit model, the diversification measure represented 
by Herfindahl index of revenues is significantly negative in both specifications of quarter-end position. 
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the greater opportunities available to our sample of banks to use alternatives to 
derivatives in the case of local currency activities, whereas such opportunities are not 
so readily available in the case of currency-related business. 
For currency volumes model, we find the coefficients for the issuance of preferred 
stock (PS) and credit risk (CREDIT) both contradict our predictions. The positive 
relationship between preferred stock issuance and derivatives use is consistent with 
the result we obtained from the probit model and provides further support for the 
hypothesis that, given that preferred stock reflects additional leverage, debt-
constrained firms are expected to incur underinvestment costs and hence, more likely 
to hedge with derivatives. The coefficient on CREDIT is negative and significant at 
the 0.1 level, and suggests that as the probability of financial distress increases, 
managers utilize fewer derivatives. This finding is inconsistent with Sinkey and Carter 
(2000) who argue that banks use derivatives in response to credit risk. One possible 
explanation for our results is that Taiwanese banks with high credit risk are closely 
monitored by the supervisory authority. Given this, banks with a high percentage of 
non-performing loans would receive further supervisory attention if they use 
derivatives to any great extent. We should note that over the time period of our study 
the overall profitability of the banking industry deteriorated, due in large part to 
increases in non-performing loans. Hence banks with a higher percentage of non-
performing loans generally have a higher probability of financial distress, receive 
greater regulatory supervision and may be deterred from using derivatives7. Hence 
local factors may contribute to our contrary results.  
Summarizing the previous discussions, our results support the view that banks 
                                                 
7 In 2001, the Taiwan government set up the Financial Restructuring Fund which provides funds to help 
banks write off non-performing loans to improve their profitability. 
 22 
with greater diversification in the form of business operations, revenues, and long-
term investments and affiliation to a financial holding company are motivated to 
engage in derivatives activities to reduce observable risks.  
Table 4, in Panels A through D, reports the effects of derivatives (currency-related 
and interest rate-related) participation on our different measures of firm risk (total 
risk, normalized total risk, systematic risk, and unsystematic risk). However, for 
brevity, we do not show the details of the results for control variables. The overall 
results show that none of the derivatives participation decisions significantly affect 
any of the bank risks with the exception of the effect of currency related participation 
on total risk. The significant and positive coefficient on the currency-related 
participation dummy supports the risk-taking hypothesis and provides evidence that 
the currency-related decision could increase the level of total risk, implying that the 
decision to use exchange rate related contracts might be driven by speculative rather 
than hedging incentives. In addition, it is worth noting that total risk (standard 
deviation of daily returns) is influenced by other economic and bank-specific 
characteristics.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
We report the influence of transaction volumes on bank risk in Table 5, Panels A 
to D. Consistent with the findings from the participation decision models, the overall 
results for the volume decision models indicate that the majority of transaction 
volume decisions have no effect on the capital market risk metrics except for the 
quarter-end interest rate position (IRQEP). The significantly negative coefficients on 
IRQEP show that the use of interest rate- related derivatives could effectively reduce 
total and unsystematic risks, despite the insignificance of interest rate-related 
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participation (IRPAR) in the model. As discussed earlier, the inconsistent results for 
IRQEP and IRPAR might be stemming from the fact that the interest rate derivatives 
market is dominated by a few large banks that have trading volumes large enough to 
influence the level of firm risk. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Following Hentschel and Kothari (2001), we form eleven quarter-end position 
(QEP) ranked derivatives portfolios; QEP is defined as Qi,t / MVi,t, where Qi,t is the 
notional value of quarter-end derivatives position for which derivatives information is 
disclosed at the end of each quarter and MVi,t is the market value of assets, the sum of 
market value of outstanding equity and the book value of liability, measured at the end 
of each quarter for bank i in quarter t. Portfolio 0 comprises bank-quarter observations 
without any end-of-quarter derivatives holdings. According to the ranked level of 
QEP, we further cluster our derivatives-user observations into ten portfolios with an 
approximately equal number of bank quarters in each portfolio and employ dummy 
variables to respectively proxy each of the eleven portfolios. Portfolio 1 includes firm 
quarters with the lowest QEP and Portfolio 10 includes firm quarters with the highest 
QEP. Then we regress bank risk on these dummies and three control variables 
financial leverage (LEVER), market value of equity (EMV), and book-to-market ratio 
(BM). The unreported results indicate that most coefficients on derivatives portfolio 
dummies are statistically insignificant, supporting the implications of the previous 
joint analysis. Like Hentschel and Kothari (2001), we cannot find, for any risk metric, 
uniform marginal changes which bear out our expectation that the risk levels differ 
between extreme users, and low-level participants, or nonusers. Moreover, based on 
the findings of the marginal effect model, we can rule out the possibility that banks 
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might base their derivatives hedging decisions on speculative incentives since, 
according to the derivatives holdings and average change of derivatives positions 
shown in the intensive derivatives-users portfolios, there is no significantly positive 
relation between derivatives holdings and risk. 
There are several caveats to the above results. First, due to the limitations of the 
derivatives disclosures under current accounting standards, quarter-end notional 
principal amount of derivatives positions, rather than mark-to-market information, are 
employed for the analysis. The notional value aggregates long and short positions, 
thereby ignoring the potential netting effect. However, in line with other studies on 
derivatives usage, it is still considered as a satisfactory measure of a bank’s 
involvement in derivatives (e.g. Colquitt and Hoyt, 1997; Goldberg et al. 1998; 
Sinkey and Carter, 2000; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001). A readily available alternative 
construct which is clearly superior to notional value simply does not currently exist 
(Nguyen and Faff, 2002). Second, the endogeneity issue might not be fully addressed. 
In practice, there is no deﬁnitive approach to identifying appropriate instruments for 
the Hausman test and 2SLS regression (Maddala, 2001, pp. 354-359). Finally, this 
study might suffer from potential serial correlation of the error terms. Data for longer 
periods and data on more firms are needed to address such an econometric problem.  
 
4. Conclusions 
The rationale for the corporate use of derivatives is well established; that for banks 
and other financial institutions less so. In our study we analyze the determinants for 
the use of derivatives using a sample of Taiwanese banks. Adopting the approach used 
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by Goldberg et al. (1999) and Nguyen and Faff (2002) different determinants are 
identified for participation and volume decisions for currency and interest rate 
derivatives. Our results indicate that bank-specific characteristics do influence 
participation. As with other studies, we find that the propensity to use derivatives is 
positively related to bank size, currency exposure, issuance of preferred stock, while 
negatively related to diversification of revenues. These findings suggest scale and 
informational economies and greater currency exposure, which cannot be easily offset 
by alternative strategies, increase the need for off-balance sheet hedging. This helps 
explain the different results for interest rate or currency related activity. This suggests 
different motivations for these instruments. 
In our results, we find some support for the substitution effect for our revenue 
diversification variable but the preferred stock issuance measure contradicts this 
finding. The interest rate volumes model results suggest that diversification of 
business operations, revenues, and long-term investments influence derivative 
volumes and indicate the existence of a substitution effect. So although somewhat 
inconsistent, our findings imply that the banks in our sample rationally consider all 
the alternatives when weighing up the decision to use derivatives. This is lent further 
credence by the fact that affiliated banks, with lower costs of entry, are found to 
utilize more interest rate related derivatives than unaffiliated ones.  
We find some support for the motivations given in the literature for risk 
management using derivatives. However, we find little support for the risk-reduction 
hypothesis. In line with Hentschel and Kothari (2001), we find no concrete evidence 
that derivatives use has any effect on a bank’s risk, proxied by total risk, normalized 
total risk, systematic risk and unsystematic risk.  
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We also find little support in our models for the agency and managerial arguments 
put forward to explain the uses of derivatives. Our variables for managerial ownership 
are largely insignificant, with the exception of the participation decision for currency 
derivatives. Nor do we find any significant result for our corporate governance proxy. 
The lack of significance may be due to the institutional, regulatory, legal, and social 
differences between this and other studies, but it is also the case that the direction of 
effect may be bank-specific and not well captured in our models. More remains to be 
done on this question. Current theories disagree on the outcome of managerial 
ownership and the effect of derivatives use. Hence this is an area that merits further 
study, especially given the different business and regulatory environment that exists 
for many banks, which current theories largely ignore. We think this may show up 
important interactions between banks’ risk-taking and the legal-managerial-corporate 
governance-regulatory nexus. 
Finally, our work has a number of implications for those interested in risk 
management in financial institutions, including regulatory authorities, practitioners, 
and stakeholders. First, some on-balance sheet hedging instruments, such as the 
diversification of revenues and long-term investments and liabilities, serve as 
alternatives to reduce bank risks. Second, we do not find much evidence that 
derivatives use either increases or decreases bank risks. This tends to suggest that 
banks do not use derivatives to modify their risks but that they are just alternative 
used to establish the desired level of risk-taking.  
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Table 1 Definitions, measurement of variables and hypothesized signs for the determinants and risk models 
Variable Mnemonic Definition 
Panel A: Derivatives usage   
 Participation decision   
   Currency-related participation FXPAR Participant dummy variable taking the value one for participants, zero otherwise a 
   Interest rate-related participation IRPAR Participant dummy that equals one for participants and zero otherwise a 
 Volume decision   
   Currency-related quarter-end position FXQEP End-of-quarter currency-related derivatives positions scaled by market value of total assets a 
   Interest rate-related quarter-end position IRQEP End-of-quarter interest rate-related derivatives positions scaled by market value of total assets a 
      
Panel B: Risk metrics   
   Total risk SDR Standard deviation of daily share returns b 
   Normalized total risk SDRN Standard deviation of daily share returns / standard deviation of daily market returns c 
   Systematic risk BETA Coefficient of the market model regression d 
   Unsystematic risk IDS Standard deviation of the error term from the market model e 
      
Panel C: Proxies of firm characteristics   
 Hypothesis 1: Growth opportunity   
   Growth opportunity GROWTH Retention ratio f × return on equity 
 Hypothesis 2a: Managerial ownership   
   Managerial ownership MO Managerial shareholdings as a percentage of all shares outstanding 
 Hypothesis 2b: Corporate governance   
   Corporate governance GOV Independent outsider directors as a percentage of all directors 
 Hypothesis 3: Avoidance of observable risks   
   Interest rate risk IGAST Interest rate sensitivity gap-to-net value ratio g 
   Interest rate risk IGLIA Interest rate sensitivity gap-to-net value ratio g 
   Currency risk FX Net income of offshore banking units / net income of parent bank 
   Credit risk CREDIT Non-performing loans h / total loans 
 Hypothesis 4: Ability to involve in derivatives market   
   Firm size SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets 
   Affiliation to the holding firm AFFIL One for banks with affiliation of bank holding company and zero otherwise 
   Profitability NIM Net interest margin i / net income 
 Hypothesis 5: Alternatives to derivatives instruments   
   Liquidity CR Current ratio 
   Dividend payout ratio DIV Cash dividends / net income 
   Issuance of preferred stock PS Book value of preferred stock/ Book value of all stocks 
   Business diversification NOI Non-operating income / operating income 
   Diversification of revenues HERFR Inverse of Herfindahl index of revenues j,k 
   Diversification of costs HERFC Inverse of Herfindahl index of costs j,l 
   Diversification of losses HERFL Inverse of Herfindahl index of losses j,m 
   Diversification of long-term investments HERFLTI Inverse of Herfindahl index of long-term investments j,n 
   Diversification of long-term liabilities HERFLTL Inverse of Herfindahl index of long-term liabilities j,o 
 Hypothesis 6: Derivatives hedging against firm risk (Control variables employed by Hentschel and Kothari, 2001) 
   Financial leverage LEVER Book value of liabilities / market value of common equity 
   Market value of equity EMV Natural logarithm of the market value of common equity 
   Book to market ratio BM Book value of assets / market value of assets p 
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Notes: Table 1 lists the information on mnemonics, definitions, and expected relations for both determinants and risk models. All variables are measured on quarter-end basis during the sample period 1998:Q2-2005:Q1.  
a The derivative contracts for hedging purpose are classified into five subcategories based on the nature of underlying assets: currency-related, interest rate-related, equity-related, commodity-related, and credit-related contracts, 
respectively. Due to the interest rate-related and currency-related derivatives trading dominate those of other types, we utilize these two kinds of contracts for examining the derivatives hedging activities. In our study, the derivatives 
utilization is measured according to participation and usage decision of derivatives. As to derivative participation, those banks disclosing notional value of derivatives positions on quarterly financial statements are referred to as 
derivative participants proxied by participant dummy set equal to one for users, and zero otherwise. The decision on the extent of derivative usage is evaluated in terms of quarter-end position, proxied by Qi,t / MVi,t, where Qi,t is the 
notional value of quarter-end derivative position for which derivative information is disclosed for bank i in quarter t, and MVi,t is the market value of assets, the sum of market value of outstanding equity and the book value of liability, 
measured at the end of each quarter. The market value of outstanding equity is defined as the sum of market value of common stock, which is measured as the closing stock price at the last trading day of each quarter multiplied by the 
number of shares outstanding at the same date, and book value of preferred stock. 
b Total risk proxied by the standard deviation of daily return for bank i in a given quarter t is computed as ( ) ( )21 1 ,1
NN r ri j ij
 
− −    = 
∑ , where N is the number of trading days in a given quarter t, ,ri j is the daily share return of 
bank i for the trading day j, and ri is the average daily stock return for bank i during quarter t. 
c Normalized total risk measured by the normalized standard deviation of daily return is computed as ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 21 1 1 1, ,1 1
N NN r r N r ri j i m j mj j
   
− − − −         = =   
∑ ∑ , where N is the number of trading days in a given quarter 
t, ,ri j denotes the daily return of bank i for the trading day j, ri is the mean daily return in quarter t, ,rm j denotes the daily index return of Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation Capitalization Weighted Stock Index (TAIEX), a proxy of 
the market return, for the trading day j, and rm is the mean daily index return of TAIEX during quarter t. 
d Systematic risk measured by beta for bank i in a given quarter t is computed as the estimate of ,i tβ in the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) based single-index model as follow:  
( ), , , , , , ,r r r ri j f j i t i t m j f j i jα β ε− = + − + , 
where, in each quarter t, ,ri j denotes the daily stock return of firm i at the trading day j, ,rf j is the risk free rate proxied by the daily interbank money market rate, ,rm j is the market return represented by the daily TAIEX index return 
for the trading day j, and ,i jε is the residual term from the CAPM regression. The error term is uncorrelated with the return on the market portfolio, ,rm j .  
e Unsystematic risk evaluated by the standard deviation of error term of the single-index regression, ,i jε , for bank i in a given quarter t is computed as ( ){ }21 2 ,1NN i jj ε−   =∑ , where N is the number of trading days in a given 
quarter t.  
f The retention ratio is constructed by dividing the retained earnings by net income. 
g The level of mismatch between asset and liability evaluated by the interest rate sensitivity gap-to-net value ratio (IGAST, for interest rate sensitive assets greater than interest rate sensitive liabilities; IGLIA, for interest rate sensitive 
liabilities larger than interest rate sensitive assets) are formulated as follow: 
interest rate sensitive assets interest rate sensitive liabilities       interest rate sensitive assets interest rate sensitive liabilities,
IGAST book value of total equity
  0                         
−
>
=
                                                                            otherwise.
interest rate sensitive liabilities interest rate sensitive assets       int
IGLIA book value of total equity




−
=
erest rate sensitive liabilities interest rate sensitive assets,
  0                                                                                                     otherwise.
 >


 
h Non-performing loans are defined as the cluster of bad loans, overdue loans, receivables under collection, and loans under abnormal payment statuses. 
i The net interest margin is defined as total interest income received less total interest expense paid, both of which are deflated by total operating income. 
j Suppose X consists of M components where each component denotes xk and k = 1,2,3,…M. The Herfindahl index is computed as ( )21
M x Xkk=∑ to measure the concentration of X. 
k Interest income, interest revenue from short-term bills, net gains on marketable securities, investment income accounted for under the equity method, recovery of unrealized losses on valuation of long-term investments, trust fee 
income, net gains on foreign exchange, commission and fee income, other operating revenues, proceeds from sale of property and equipment, and proceeds from bad loans are used to calculate Herfindahl index of revenues. 
l Interest expense, allowance for bad debts, commission and fee paid, brokerage securities transaction charges, cost upon credit card business, operating expenses, and operating taxes are used to calculate Herfindahl index of costs. 
m Realized and unrealized losses on long-term investments, trading security, currency, assets reassessment, disposal of properties, and disposal of collaterals assumed are used to calculate Herfindahl index of losses. 
n Long-term investments in stocks, bonds, real estate, currency-related assets, and treasury stock are used to calculate Herfindahl index of long-term investments. 
o Long-term liability, financial debenture, appropriated loan fund, interbank borrowing, and advance from customs are used to calculate Herfindahl index of long-term liabilities. 
p The market value of assets is measured by the sum of market value of equity and the book value of liability. 
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Summary statistics from sample Table 2!! 
 
Table 2 
Probit analysis of the determinants explaining derivative participation, based on Eq. (3) 
Variable                      
  Expected sign  Currency participation  Interest rate participation 
          Coefficient 1 z-Statistic     Coefficient 1 z-Statistic   
 Constant    -4.4433   -3.6220  ***  -1.1718   -0.8850   
 GROWTH  ＋  0.0068   0.0750    0.1494   1.2030   
 MO  ？  -21.6226   -1.3020    12.4467   0.6850   
 GOV  ？  -0.7140   -0.3200    -12.6431   -1.5740   
 IGAST  ＋  -0.0167   -0.0880    -0.0589   -0.2760   
 IGLIA  ＋  0.0023   0.0810    0.0610   1.9580  * 
 FX  ＋  5.2079   4.7790  ***  6.0628   4.3010  *** 
 CREDIT  ＋  -0.0757   -0.0530    -2.5915   -1.4410   
 SIZE  ？  0.2809   4.4290  ***  0.2794   4.1610  *** 
 AFFIL  ？  0.0082   0.0590    -0.2429   -1.5410   
 NIM  ＋  0.4830   0.8940    1.3892   2.3690  ** 
 CR  －  0.0003   0.0310    -0.0191   -1.7810  * 
 DIV  ＋  -0.2865   -2.2220  **  0.0908   0.8450   
 PS  －  2.6454   2.8020  ***  2.1339   2.0620  ** 
 NOI  －  0.4623   0.2470    2.3729   1.0930   
 HERFR  －  -1.2115   -2.4510  **  -4.4991   -8.1150  *** 
 HERFC  －  0.3632   0.5240    -0.4858   -0.6210   
 HERFL  －  0.2566   1.1230    0.2114   0.8690   
 HERFLTI  －  -0.0467   -0.1790    0.0893   0.3040   
 HERFLTL  －  -0.3486   -1.3990    -1.4067   -4.9550  *** 
0 GROWTH 0 Hypothesized 0 Coefficient *** z-Statistic *** 0 Coefficient *** z-Statistic *** 
Number of observations 934     934    
Likelihood ratio test a 157.8303 ***    386.5966 ***   
LM test b 390.0387 ***    364.5674 ***   
McFadden R2 0.1275         0.3019       
 
 
Notes: Table 2 reports results of the probit analysis for participation decision in which the dependent variable equals one if the 
bank discloses notional principal of derivatives positions on quarterly financial statements, and zero otherwise over the period 
1998:Q2-2005:Q1, for a total of 934 observations. The details of each variable are presented in Table 1. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
a Significance suggests that coefficients of independent variables are jointly statistically different from zero. 
b Significance suggests that a regression relation does exist between the dependent and explanatory variables. 
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Table 3 
Determinants model measuring factors affecting the level of derivative usage, based on 
Eq. (4) 
Variable                      
  Expected sign  Currency volume  Interest rate volume 
          Coefficient 1 z-Statistic     Coefficient 1 z-Statistic   
 Constant    -0.0001   -0.0050    0.0360   2.2770  ** 
 GROWTH  ＋  0.0005   0.2340    0.0005   0.3740   
 MO  ？  -0.3893   -1.0890    0.2724   1.2530   
 GOV  ？  -0.0489   -1.2130    -0.0130   -0.5270   
 IGAST  ＋  -0.0021   -0.6330    -0.0001   -0.0420   
 IGLIA  ＋  0.0002   0.3410    0.0001   0.2350   
 FX  ＋  0.0289   1.1250    -0.0101   -0.6460   
 CREDIT  ＋  -0.0001   -0.0050    -0.0246   -1.3000   
 SIZE  ？  0.0012   0.9060  ***  0.0000   -0.0420   
 AFFIL  ？  0.0008   0.2650    0.0167   9.4320  *** 
 NIM  ＋  0.0023   0.2100    0.0039   0.5960   
 CR  －  0.0001   0.5420    -0.0001   -0.4980   
 DIV  ＋  -0.0003   -0.1460    0.0014   1.1900   
 PS  －  0.1209   5.0020  ***  0.0113   0.7680   
 NOI  －  -0.0169   -0.4850    -0.0525   -2.4790  ** 
 HERFR  －  -0.0166   -1.7120  *  -0.0253   -4.3010  *** 
 HERFC  －  -0.0038   -0.2860    -0.0079   -0.9730   
 HERFL  －  -0.0010   -0.2480    0.0026   1.0180   
 HERFLTI  －  0.0004   0.0610    -0.0114   -3.2730  *** 
 HERFLTL  －  0.0003   0.0570    -0.0020   -0.5570   
0 GROWTH 0 Hypothesized 0 Coefficient *** z-Statistic *** 0 Coefficient *** z-Statistic *** 
Number of observations 934      934     
White test a 3.5418  ***    8.0401  ***   
LM test b 135.5400  ***    70.5200  ***   
Hausman test c / method d 0.0000   REM    0.0000    REM   
 
Notes: Table 3 reports results of the panel data analysis for volume decision in which the dependent variable describing 
the extent of derivatives usage is measured by quarter-end position of derivatives utilization using quarterly data from 
1998:Q2 through 2005:Q1, for a total of 934 observations. The details of each variable are presented in Table 1. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
a Significance suggests the presence of heteroscedasticity in the error term and as a result, heteroscedasticity-consistent 
estimation suggested by (Greene, 2003, pp. 316-317) is performed to derive White-adjusted t-statistics. 
b Significance suggests a rejection of the null hypothesis that OLS is the correct specification and consequently 
application of the pooled regression technique is required (Greene, 2003, pp. 298-301). 
c Significance suggests that a fixed-effects model would be more appropriate and the random-effects model if otherwise 
(Greene, 2003, pp. 301-303). 
d To determine the most appropriate regression model for each specification, we follow a two-stage diagnostic procedure 
(Greene, 2003, pp. 298-303). We start with the LM test to explore the relative efficiency of the heterogeneous 
fixed/random-effects estimation against the homogeneous pooled OLS model. The significance of LM test statistic 
suggests that panel data models are more efficient than the pooled cross-sectional OLS model. In the second step, we 
conduct a Hausman specification test to decide which type of panel models–fixed- or random-effects–should be 
employed in our study. 
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Table 4 
Effects of derivatives participation on firm risks, based on Eq. (5) 
Variable    Equations 
Panel A: The effect of participation on total risk  
   
Expected 
sign 
 Currency participation  Interest rate participation  
 
      
        Coefficient   t-Statistic     Coefficient   t-Statistic     
 FXPAR  ?  0.1659   2.4560  **       
 IRPAR  ?       0.0731   0.9670    
               
Number of observations 926      926      
Adjusted R2 0.1217      0.1168      
F-test e 7.7500  ***   7.4400  ***   
White test f 2.4258  ***   2.3836  ***   
LM test g 1.3500      1.6400      
Hausman test h / method i 0.0000   OLS   0.0000   OLS   
1 NTFXPAR 1 Hypothesized 1     1 Coefficient *** t-Statistic *** 1 
Panel B: The effect of participation on normalized total risk  
   
Expected 
sign 
 Currency participation  Interest rate participation  
 
      
        Coefficient   t-Statistic     Coefficient   t-Statistic     
 FXPAR  ?  0.0327   0.6320         
 IRPAR  ?       0.0468   0.8050    
1  1  1    *** 1  ***  *** 1 
Number of observations 926     926      
Adjusted R2           
F-test           
White test  2.3557  ***   2.3116  ***   
LM test 4.4800  **   4.5400  **   
Hausman test / method 0.0000   REM   0.0000   REM   
1 NTFXPAR 1 Hypothesized 1 Coefficient *** t-Statistic *** 1 Coefficient *** t-Statistic *** 1 
Panel C: The effect of participation on systematic risk  
   
Expected 
sign 
 Currency participation  Interest rate participation  
 
      
        Coefficient   t-Statistic     Coefficient   t-Statistic     
 FXPAR  ?  0.0223   0.7830         
 IRPAR  ?       0.0115   0.3540    
1  1  1    *** 1  ***  *** 1 
Number of observations 926      926      
Adjusted R2           
F-test           
White test  2.3330  ***   2.4187  ***   
LM test 477.7200  ***   492.0600  ***   
Hausman test / method 0.0000   REM   0.0000   REM   
1 NTFXPAR 1 Hypothesized 1 Coefficient *** t-Statistic *** 1 Coefficient *** t-Statistic *** 1 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Effects of derivatives participation on firm risks, based on Eq. (5) 
Variable    Equations 
Panel D: The effect of participation on idiosyncratic risk 
   
Expected 
sign 
 Currency participation  Interest rate participation  
 
      
        Coefficient   t-Statistic     Coefficient   t-Statistic     
 FXPAR  ?  0.1261   0.0648  *       
 IRPAR  ?       0.0128   0.0726    
1 NTFXPAR 1 Hypothesized 1    *** 1 Coefficient *** t-Statistic *** 1 
Number of observations 926     926      
Adjusted R2 0.1612     0.1578      
F-test 10.4400  ***   10.2000  ***   
White test  2.4950  ***   2.4468  ***   
LM test 1.8000      2.2300      
Hausman test / method 0.0000    OLS     0.0000    OLS     
  
Notes: This table reports results of the risk model for the participation decisions on firm risks, as specified in Eq (5), 
for the period 1998:Q2-2005:Q1. The details of each variable are presented in Table 1. For brevity, the estimates of 
the constant term and control variables are not tabulated but they are available upon request. The four different risk 
metrics specified as the dependent variable are total risk, normalized total risk, systematic risk, and unsystematic risk 
as defined in Panel D of Table 1. The influences of derivatives participation on these risks, in turn, are presented in 
Panels A-D. According to the nature of underlying assets, the non-trading participation decisions, measured by binary 
dummy variables assigned one for users and zero otherwise, are categorized into currency-related participation 
(FXPAR), and interest rate-related participation (IRPAR) within each panel. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Effects of derivatives usage on firm risks, based on Eq. (6) 
Variable    Equations 
     
Panel A:  
Dependent variable: Firm risk 
measured by total risk  
Panel B:  
Dependent variable: Firm 
risk measured by 
normalized total risk  
  
*** 
O 
*** 
O 
Currency 
Extent 
Interest rate 
Extent 
Currency 
Extent 
Interest rate 
Extent 
   Expected 
sign 
             
O       Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient   
 FXQEP  ?  0.0381      -0.7349       
 IRQEP  ?     -7.0471  ***     1.1365   
O  O  O      O  *** O   O 
Number of observations 926    926   926    926    
Adjusted R2 0.1159             
F-test 7.3800  ***           
White test 2.3275  ***  2.3775  ***  2.2410  ***  2.8446  ***  
LM test 2.2500    4.5900  **  4.7800  **  4.1700  **  
Hausman test 0.0000    4.2000    0.0000    0.0000    
Method OLS   REM   REM   REM   
             
Variable O  O Equations *** O  *** O  *** O  *** O 
     
Panel C:  
Dependent variable: Firm risk 
measured by systematic risk 
 
Panel D: 
Dependent variable: Firm 
risk measured by 
idiosyncratic risk 
 
  
*** 
O 
*** 
Currency 
Extent 
Interest rate 
Extent  
Currency 
Extent 
Interest rate 
Extent   
   Expected 
sign 
              
 
O       Coefficient   Coefficient   Coefficient   Coefficient   
 FXQEP  ?  -0.0280       9.6406      
 IRQEP  ?     0.6431       -6.3735  ***  
O  O  O      O  *** O  *** O 
Number of observations 926    926    926    926    
Adjusted R2       0.0969       
F-test       6.2700  ***     
White test 2.3559  ***  2.4508  ***  2.3918  ***  2.4837  ***  
LM test 492.0700  ***  471.9800  ***     3.7100  *  
Hausman test 0.0000    0.0000       0.0000    
Method REM   REM   2SLS ***  REM ***  
Notes: This table provides estimation results of the risk model for the effects of volume decisions on firm 
risks, as specified in Eq (6), for the period 1998:Q2-2005:Q1. The details of each variable are presented in 
Table 1. For brevity, the estimates of the constant term and control variables are not tabulated but they are 
available upon request. The four different risk metrics specified as the dependent variable are total risk, 
normalized total risk, systematic risk, and unsystematic risk as defined in Panel D of Table 1. The 
influences of derivatives decision on these risks, in turn, are presented in Panel A-D. Within each panel, 
the derivatives decisions are categorized into two main types: quarter-end currency derivatives (FXQEP), 
and quarter-end interest rate derivatives (IRQEP). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
